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One of the pleasures of contributing to symposia—especially symposia
where each contribution is brief—is the ability to engage in new explora-
tions, test new ideas, and offer new provocations. I do that now in this
essay about race, architecture, and criminal justice. I begin by discussing
how race is imbricated in the architecture of courthouses, the quintessential
place of supposed justice. I then take race and architecture a step further. If
we think of architecture expansively—Lawrence Lessig’s definition of ar-
chitecture as “the physical world as we find it” comes to mind—then it
becomes clear that race is also imbricated in the very architecture of the
Fourth Amendment. All of this raises an interesting question: If the very
architecture of the Fourth Amendment is the problem—not just its interpre-
tation but its very design—what are we to do?
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have been thinking quite a bit about race and architecture recently.Part of this is attributable to a brilliant show at the Museum of Mod-ern Art in New York (MoMA), which I was lucky enough to see. The
show, Reconstructions: Architecture and Blackness in America, features
works of Black architects and designers who are normally excluded from
the canon.1 (It is telling that the architecture rooms at MoMA are named
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center on Race, Law, and Justice, Fordham
School of Law. Special thanks to Peter Angelica for his insightful research assistance, and
to the editorial team on SMU Law Review for their work on this essay.
1. A description of the exhibition can be found on the museum’s website. See Recon-
structions: Architecture and Blackness in America, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, https://
www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/5219 [https://perma.cc/CRY7-FJV6]. There is also a
catalogue that accompanies the exhibit. See SEAN ANDERSON, MABEL O. WILSON, ARIÈLE
DIONNE-KROSNICK & AARON SMITHSON, RECONSTRUCTIONS: ARCHITECTURE AND
BLACKNESS IN AMERICA (Sarah Kramer & Don McMahon eds., 2021).
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for Phillip Johnson, a world-renowned architect and the founding director
of MoMA’s architecture department—Johnson was also an avowed ra-
cist.)2 But featuring Black architects is only the start. The show also
reimagines “architecture from the perspective of Black people.”3 Or as
Michael Kimmelman, the art critic for The New York Times put it, “How
can Blackness construct America?”4
But even before the show opened, architecture was increasingly on my
mind. There was President Trump’s executive order—called “Promoting
Beautiful Federal Civic Architecture”—issued during the last month of
his waning presidency.5 The order mandated that all new federal build-
ings adhere to “classical” and other “traditional” styles, and specifically
praised Greek and Roman styles of architecture.6 Members of the non-
profit Architecture Lobby, anticipating this order—it was a year in the
works—had already issued a statement making clear their disapproval
and noting, among other things, that “Neoclassicism in the US is directly
related to the construction of whiteness.”7 Against this backdrop, I was
also vaguely aware of the Academy of Architecture for Justice, the
“networking group for [American Institute of Architects] member archi-
tects whose clients include police departments, county sheriffs, courts,
and corrections departments.”8
Indeed, since “subject position is everything in my analysis of the law,”
to borrow a line from Patricia Williams,9 it would probably be more accu-
rate to say that I have been thinking about race and architecture for
years. For the most part, though, I’ve kept my thoughts to myself. Only
recently have I begun putting my thoughts onto the page.10
One of the pleasures of contributing to symposia—especially symposia
where each contribution is brief—is the ability to engage in new explora-
tions, test new ideas, and offer new provocations. I do that now in this
essay about race, architecture, and criminal justice. I begin, in Part Two,
2. Matt Hickman, Philip Johnson’s Name Covered at MoMA for Reconstructions: Ar-
chitecture and Blackness in America, THE ARCHITECT’S NEWSPAPER (Mar. 2, 2021), https://
www.archpaper.com/2021/03/philip-johnson-name-covered-at-moma-for-reconstructions-
architecture-and-blackness-in-america [https://perma.cc/8J9N-4KTW].




5. Exec. Order No. 13967, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,739 (Dec. 18, 2020).
6. Neda Ulaby & Elizabeth Blair, Keep It Classical, Says Trump Order on Federal
Architecture, NPR (Dec. 21, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/21/948926995/
keep-it-classical-says-trump-order-on-federal-architecture [https://perma.cc/RQT7-7CKP].
7. Claire Selvin, Trump Issues Executive Order Mandating ‘Beautiful’ Architecture for
Federal Buildings, ARTNEWS (Dec. 21, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.artnews.com/art-news/
news/trump-signs-executive-order-classical-architecture-1234579994 [https://perma.cc/
72K6-29JZ].
8. Raphael Sperry, Is “Justice Architecture” Just?, AGGREGATE (Mar. 2015), http://
www.we-aggregate.org/piece/is-justice-architecture-just [https://perma.cc/T5RM-N75V].
9. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 1 (1991).
10. See Bennett Capers, The Law School as a White Space?, 106 MINN. L. REV. (forth-
coming fall 2021).
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by discussing how race is imbricated in the architecture of so many of our
places of supposed justice: courthouses. Part Three takes race and archi-
tecture a step further: it argues that if we think of architecture expan-
sively—Lawrence Lessig’s definition of architecture as “the physical
world as we find it” comes to mind11—then it becomes clear that race is
also imbricated in the very architecture of the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE COURTHOUSE
It may seem strange to discuss architecture in legal scholarship. Indeed,
for many of us, architecture is just something in the background. It may
affect our mood, and we may have a general sense of the built environ-
ment around us, but rarely is it the focus of legal scholarship.12
But of course, architecture is more than this. For starters, architecture
is “a way of engineering relationships among people that, after a time,
becomes just another part of the landscape.”13 Beyond this, we live in
a built environment that is not only compromised but also, as the
critic Ta-Nehisi Coates contends, “argues against the truth of who
[we] are.” These injustices are embedded in nearly every aspect of
America’s design—an inheritance of segregated neighborhoods,
compromised infrastructures, environmental toxins, and unequal ac-
cess to financial and educational institutions.14
Think of architecture connected to city planning, which has a long his-
tory of facilitating segregation along lines of race and class, as Deborah
Archer has written.15 For her part, Elise Boddie has written about “the
racial identifiability of spaces,” which is often a result of a history of ex-
clusion.16 All of this suggests architecture can have an expressive func-
tion. This is certainly true of classical architecture in this country. Simply
put, Trump’s efforts to mandate that federal buildings be built in the
classical style is anything but valueless. There is a reason that the mem-
bers of the far-right view “ancient Greeks and Romans as the originators
11. Lawrence Lessig famously defined architecture as “the physical world as we find it,
even if ‘as we find it’ is simply how it has already been made.” Lawrence Lessig, Commen-
tary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507
(1999). I cannot think of a better definition.
12. For a few notable exceptions, see generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002); Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Jus-
tice: Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L.
& HUMS. 311 (2012).
13. Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 124 (1980).
14. See Reconstructions: Architecture and Blackness in America, supra note 1 (quoting
TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 99 (Chris Jackson ed., 2015)).
15. Deborah N. Archer, “White Men’s Roads Through Black Men’s Homes”: Advanc-
ing Racial Equity Through Highway Reconstruction, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2020)
(detailing the role highway construction has played in segregating cities along lines of race
and proposing that jurisdictions consider racial equity impact going forward); see also Sa-
rah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical
Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1939 (2015) (examining “the some-
times subtle ways that the built environment has been used to keep certain segments of the
population—typically poor people and people of color—separate from others”).
16. Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 414 n.63 (2010).
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of so-called white culture” and that “[m]archers in Charlottesville, Va.,
carried flags bearing a symbol of the Roman state.”17 Classical architec-
ture in this country has always been a way of claiming a particular line-
age.18 Given that so many courthouses adopted a neoclassical style
starting in the nineteenth century, it is surprising that the connection be-
tween the architecture of courthouses and whiteness has not been dis-
cussed more.
That is beginning to change, at least if we think of architecture as in-
cluding not only buildings but also interior design and other aesthetic ele-
ments. Consider a recent decision from Judge David Bernhard of the
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Virginia that garnered coverage in The
Washington Post, The New York Times, and other media.19 The decision
was in response to a “Motion to Remove Portraiture Overwhelmingly
Depicting White Jurists Hanging in Trial Courtroom.”20 For the judge,
the issue was whether he “should permit a jury trial to take place in a
courtroom gilded with portraits of jurists, particularly when they are
overwhelmingly of white individuals peering down on an African Ameri-
can defendant.”21 In ruling for the defendant—and indeed issuing a rul-
ing that would apply to all criminal trials in his courtroom going
forward—the judge made clear that it was irrelevant whether any particu-
lar judge depicted in a portrait had expressed racist views.22 What mat-
tered was the expressive message communicated by “symbols that
ornament the hallowed courtrooms of justice to favor a particular race or
color.”23 Concluding the “portraits may serve as unintended but implicit
symbols that suggest the courtroom may be a place historically adminis-
tered by whites for whites, and that others are thus of lesser standing in
the dispensing of justice”24 and would thus deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, the judge ruled, going forward, all cases before him would proceed
“in a courtroom devoid of portraits in the furtherance of justice.”25
17. Rachel Poser, He Wants to Save Classics from Whiteness. Can the Field Survive?,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/magazine/classics-
greece-rome-whiteness.html [https://perma.cc/3FXH-TK5B].
18. See Kate Wagner, Duncing About Architecture, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 8, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/156509/donald-trump-war-on-architecture [https://
perma.cc/79UM-8DTK].
19. See, e.g., Derrick Bryson Taylor, Virginia Judge Won’t Try Black Man in Court-
room Lined with White Portraits, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
01/01/us/virginia-judge-white-portraits.html [https://perma.cc/DQ6X-UWFP]; Justin
Jouvenal, Va. Judge Rules Black Defendant Can’t Get a Fair Trial in Courtroom Largely
Featuring Portraits of White Judges, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2020, 2:26 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/courtroom-portraits-judges-ruling/2020/12/22/
366c57a8-445e-11eb-975c-d17b8815a66d_story.html [https://perma.cc/L57B-XBX5].
20. Commonwealth v. Shipp, No. FE-2020-8, 2020 WL 7638843, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 20, 2020).
21. Id. at *1.
22. Id. at *1–2.
23. Id. at *5.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *6.
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To be sure, Judge Bernhard’s decision is noteworthy for its willingness
to reckon with the law’s implicit role in this country’s racial history. It is
no coincidence that he issued his decision against the backdrop of efforts
to address racism in this country following the shooting of George Floyd
and what The New York Times described as possibly the largest move-
ment in American history.26 As Judge Bernhard noted:
We stand at a point in judicial history where the moment calls for
heightened attention to the past inequities visited upon persons of
color and minorities. On August 14, 2020, the fifteen current judges
of the Fairfax Circuit Court, seizing on that moment, unanimously
affixed their signature to a collective landmark “Initial Plan of Ac-
tion to Address Systemic Racism and Enhance Civic Engagement
With Our Community.”27
But the decision’s greater significance is its recognition of the expressive
messages communicated by architecture—or at least portraits—about
who belongs and who does not, who is a full citizen entitled to full and
equal protection of the law and who is not.
And of course, it is not just portraits of jurists adorning courtroom
walls that “serve as unintended but implicit symbols that suggest the
courtroom may be a place historically administered by whites for
whites.”28 I have written previously about images of Lady Justice—blind-
folded, the scales of justice in one hand, a sword in the other.29 While her
blindfold is understood to represent her impartiality, her blindness and
impartiality also suggest a reliance on whiteness as a default.30 In criminal
law, where the belief of a defendant is measured against that of a reason-
able person—think self-defense cases or even police use-of-force cases—
is the reasonable person that Justice imagines when she turns a blind eye
to the particularities of a white person? Is the person middle-class? Col-
lege educated? But more importantly, although rarely commented on,
Justice herself, almost invariably figured as white, sends the expressive
message about the very whiteness of the law.31
And then there is the architecture of courtrooms themselves, those
“temples of justice,” so many of which remain in the neoclassical style,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, and so many of which reference “the
influence of Thomas Jefferson’s designs.”32 As the art critic Michael Kim-
26. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/3V5C-
JCWU].
27. Shipp, 2020 WL 7638843, at *2.
28. Id. at *5.
29. See Bennett Capers, Blind Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMS. 179, 180 (2012) (discuss-
ing the messages conveyed by the whiteness of Lady Justice); see also Bennett Capers, On
Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 203, 203–04 (2006).
30. See Capers, On Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness, supra note 29, at 224–25.
31. See id.; Capers, Blind Justice, supra note 29, at 180.
32. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTRO-
VERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 137 (2011).
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melman points out, classical architecture in this country can “dredge[ ] up
images of antebellum America, when classicizing Federal architecture
was all the rage.”33 But it is more than this. Classical architecture in this
country conjures a segregated past where non-whites tended to be pro-
hibited from testifying against whites in some places, or against anyone in
other places.34 A history of California courthouses has acknowledged that
“African Americans were barred by law from giving testimony in Califor-
nia courts until 1863; Asians and Native Americans were excluded until
1872.”35 Indeed, even after race-based restrictions on testimony were of-
ficially lifted, race still mattered. In North Carolina, courts required that
“whenever a person of color shall be examined as a witness, the court
shall warn the witness to declare the truth.”36 And in Oregon, the state
supreme court twice ruled that Chinese witnesses must be viewed with
special scrutiny, stating in one case that “[e]xperience convinces
every[one] that the testimony of Chinese witnesses is very unreliable.”37
These courtrooms conjure too a history of segregated courtrooms,
where African Americans were consigned to sitting or standing in the
back of the courtroom, or upstairs—think of the courtroom scenes in To
Kill a Mockingbird.38 Even after de jure restrictions were lifted, de facto
restrictions held sway in many places, with the law lurking not far behind.
Consider the case against Ford T. Johnson, a Black man who was con-
victed of contempt of court in 1960s Virginia when he sat in a section
“reserved for whites” and refused to move to the “section reserved for
Negroes.”39 It took a Supreme Court case, Johnson v. Virginia, to reverse
his conviction on equal protection grounds.40
Finally, add to this the long history of extrajudicial justice being meted
out in front of courthouses during the period following Reconstruction.
As Sherrilyn Ifill observes in her book On the Courthouse Lawn: Con-
fronting the Legacy of Lynching in the Twenty-First Century, “Between
1900 and 1935 courthouse lawns on the Eastern Shore were routinely
sites of lynchings or near lynchings, involving the participation of hun-
33. Michael Kimmelman, MAGA War on Architectural Diversity Weaponizes Greek
Columns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/arts/design/fed-
eral-building-architecture.html [https://perma.cc/8J7K-4Q8D].
34. See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 684–85
(1997); see also Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867,
889 (2018).
35. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 32, at 138.
36. Fisher, supra note 34, at 685 (quoting ch. 40, § 10, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 99, 102).
37. State v. Mah, 10 P. 306, 306–07 (1886). In the second case, State v. Ching Ling, the
court stated that the “Chinamen . . . will not hesitate to conspire” and implored juries “to
be prudent, vigilant, and discriminating.” 18 P. 844, 847 (1888). For more on Asian Ameri-
cans and the presumption against credibility, see Gabriel J. Chin, “A Chinaman’s Chance”
in Court: Asian Pacific Americans and Racial Rules of Evidence, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
965, 970–72 (2013).
38. A clip from the film can be found on YouTube. See Movieclips, To Kill a Mocking-
bird (8/10) Movie CLIP – Your Father’s Passing (1962) HD, YOUTUBE (May 27, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7CX_5D6y6E [https://perma.cc/CDN8-25SD].
39. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 61–62 (1963).
40. Id.
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dreds and sometimes thousands of white onlookers.”41 The fact that these
lynchings, which extended back into the 1800s, occurred in front of court-
houses was no accident: “The courthouse lawn . . . was a very deliberate
choice of venue for lynching”42 and part of a broader practice of using
public spaces “to enforce the message of white supremacy.”43 All of this
contributes to how courthouses in this country, at least those in the classi-
cal style, remained raced,44 simultaneously conveying messages of justice
and injustice.
Of course, the criminal “justice” system has other problems besides the
expressive messages communicated by courthouses in the classical style
or by images of a white Lady Justice, or by portraits of white jurists. Our
jails cycle through approximately ten million people each year,45 with the
vast majority of people awaiting trial for nonviolent offenses while we, as
a society, keep telling ourselves that everyone is innocent until proven
guilty. We have one of the highest incarceration rates in the world,46 even
though there is nothing particularly exceptional about our rate of crime
compared to those of other countries.47 Indeed, we are at a point where
one in every three adults in America has a criminal record,48 and for
every fifteen persons born in 2001, one will likely spend time in jail or
prison,49 and yet for the most part, “we” take this all in stride as just how
things are. To be sure, there are growing calls to defund the police and for
abolition, and even more calls for reforms at the margins—what aboli-
41. SHERRILYN A. IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY
OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7–8 (2007).
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 16.
44. Critical Race Theory scholars have long argued that we should think of “race” as a
verb. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Commentary, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Read-
ing of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806–07 (1993) (“[W]e are ‘raced’
through a constellation of practices that construct and control racial subjectivities.”); john
a. powell, The “Racing” of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying
as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. 99, 103–05 (1997).
45. ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251210, JAIL INMATES IN 2016, at 1 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9QW-9P9J] (noting that
jails “reported 10.6 million admissions during 2016”).
46. ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RSCH., WORLD PRISON POPULATION
LIST 2 (12th ed. 2018), https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/down
loads/wppl_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8S3-D5GA].
47. See, e.g., U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 12, 126
(Jonathan Gibbons ed., 2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_
GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LK8-XJPJ] (showing that the
U.S. homicide rate is actually below average).
48. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, BARRIERS TO WORK: PEOPLE WITH CRIMI-
NAL RECORDS 1 (2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/barriers-to-
work-individuals-with-criminal-records.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y3XH-DPHZ]; THE SEN-
TENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 1 (2015), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-
Records-Poverty-and-Opportunity-Profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P2T-V992].
49. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 197976, PREVALENCE OF
IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 7 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB2M-WNGF].
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tionists call “reformists reforms”50—but for the most part, we take the
system, warts and all, as a given. Even during this great pandemic, when
one would think we would band together, there is still the sense that the
incarcerated should be at the back of the line.51
And of course, these are just some of the problems that permeate the
system. One could add police violence and the farce of qualified immu-
nity.52 Or the coercion of plea “bargaining.”53 Or the fact that we elect
prosecutors and judges.54 Or the unbridled power of prosecutors, and in-
creasing diminution in power of “we, the people.”55 Or the fact that our
prisons are hell-holes.56 Trust me, I do not mean to diminish these other
problems.
I began by referencing the “Reconstructions: Architecture and Black-
ness in America” show at the MoMA in New York. In his preface to the
catalogue that accompanies the show, the historian Robin D.G. Kelley
writes, “[D]ismantling racism depends on transforming the built environ-
ment.”57 If that is true, and I am persuaded it is, then my larger point is
simply this: It is time for us to think seriously about the architecture of
courthouses and the environment around them.
III. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Allow me to return to race, which for me remains the overarching
problem when we talk about the criminal system. Some may disagree,
especially those who are more removed from the criminal system. Espe-
cially too, those who are not burdened by a “racial tax,”58 but instead
benefit from a “racial privilege.”59 I am thinking here of an observation
made by the historian Khalil Gibran Muhammad: “White people, by and
large, do not know what it is like to be occupied by a police force. They
don’t understand it because it is not the type of policing they experience.
Because they are treated like individuals, they believe that if ‘I am not
50. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1781, 1826 (2020).
51. See David Montgomery, Prioritizing Prisoners for Vaccines Stirs Controversy, THE
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analy-
sis/blogs/stateline/2021/01/05/prioritizing-prisoners-for-vaccines-stirs-controversy [https://
perma.cc/5LXX-QCHP].
52. Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point
Amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/
qualified-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/X6DC-9528].
53. See, e.g., Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1277,
1290 (2016).
54. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 581, 582 (2009).
55. See Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1561, 1572 (2020).
56. Yvonne Jewkes, Fear-Suffused Hell-Holes: The Architecture of Extreme Punish-
ment, in EXTREME PUNISHMENT 1 (Karamet Reiter & Alexa Koenig eds., 2015).
57. Robin D.G. Kelley, Preface to ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
58. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997).
59. Bennett Capers, The Under-Policed, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589, 593 (2016).
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breaking the law, I will never be abused.’”60
But if one is closer to the criminal system and willing to be honest, then
the overarching problem of race seems beyond dispute. There are the
disparities in incarceration.61 There are the perplexing twin problems of
both over- and under-policing.62 There is the assumption that “young plus
black plus male” practically “equals probable cause.”63 There is the much
greater risk of physical harm at the hands of police,64 to say nothing of
the risk of death; across the nation police violence is the sixth leading
cause of death for young black men.65 One study calculates the risk of a
black youth being killed by the police as twenty-one times greater than
the risk of a white youth being killed by the police.66 Add to this the fact
that almost every parent of a black child, especially a black male child, is
obligated to give that child “the talk,” a “talk” so well known that Justice
Sotomayor referred to it in Utah v. Strieff.67 I am reminded of a panel I
was recently on at Michigan Law School with Aya Gruber and Andrew
Crespo. I asserted that when it comes to criminal justice, race is the ele-
phant in the room. When it was Andrew Crespo’s turn to speak, he
agreed, but took it a step further. “Race isn’t just the elephant in the
room. In many ways, it is the room.”68
Crespo was right, of course. But two things strike me now. First, how
this assertion—race is the room—brings me back to architecture, espe-
cially if we think of the term “architecture” even more expansively. Sec-
ond, how even as I was nodding my head, agreeing with Crespo’s
60. Nikole Hannah-Jones, A Letter from Black America, POLITICO MAG. (Apr. 2015)
(quoting Khalil Gibran Muhammad), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/let-
ter-from-black-america-police-115545 [https://perma.cc/6BK6-UNA3].
61. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 4 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Pris-
ons.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JFG-MM8U].
62. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1715–19
(2006).
63. See generally Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where
Young + Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621 (1993).
64. PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF, TRACEY LLOYD, AMANDA GELLER, STEVEN RAPHAEL &
JACK GLASER, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS,
AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 14 (July 2016), https://policingequity.org/images/pdfs-doc/
CPE_SoJ_Race-Arrests-UoF_2016-07-08-1130.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5QS-5Y5D].
65. See Police: Sixth-Leading Cause of Death for Young Black Men, INST. FOR SOC.
RSCH., UNIV. OF MICH. (June 1, 2020), https://isr.umich.edu/news-events/news-releases/po-
lice-sixth-leading-cause-of-death-for-young-black-men-2 [https://perma.cc/7SRT-6J8P].
66. Ryan Gabrielson, Eric Sagara & Ryann Grochowski Jones, Deadly Force, in Black
and White, PROPUBLICA, (Dec. 23, 2014) https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-
in-black-and-white [https://perma.cc/2C4L-V489].
67. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“For generations, black
and brown parents have given their children ‘the talk’—instructing them never to run
down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of
talking back . . . all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.”). For
another example of the “talk,” see Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citi-
zen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 696–97 (2018).
68. See Michigan Journal of Race & Law (@UMichRaceLaw), TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2021,
7:31 AM), https://twitter.com/UMichRaceLaw/status/1367467670409510914 [https://
perma.cc/5GM9-G7JH].
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intervention, I was still thinking too narrowly. For me, in that moment,
race being the room was on par with everything I was already thinking
about the criminal system. It was on par with saying nearly every decision
in the criminal system is inflected by race. And in the criminal procedure
context, it was on par with what several scholars, myself included, had
been arguing for years: that so many of the criminal procedure protec-
tions we take for granted owe much to race.69
It was only later, when I was revisiting Utah v. Strieff in my Criminal
Procedure class, that I began to see Crespo’s “room” comment differ-
ently, perhaps in a way he did not intend. I was borrowing a class exercise
from my friend, the brilliant scholar Jocelyn Simonson. For the class exer-
cise, which she calls “Strieff, the Annotated Dissent,” I asked students to
re-read Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v Strieff—we’d previously
read the decision when we first discussed the exclusionary rule under the
Fourth Amendment and its subsequent erosion—but now, later in the
semester, I wanted them to focus on the last five paragraphs of her opin-
ion and the cases she cited there, none of which relate directly to the
exclusionary rule or its exceptions.70 I asked the students to ponder how
these cases relate to her legal argument, which at bottom objects to the
majority’s decision to further dilute the exclusionary rule.71 Following
Jocelyn Simonson’s lead, I also provided students with excerpts from the
secondary sources Justice Sotomayor cited and asked the students to read
at least one of these sources and ponder how it fits into Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent.
The cases Justice Sotomayor cited include Terry v. Ohio, in which the
Court gave its blessing to stop-and-frisks based merely on reasonable sus-
picion,72 and Illinois v. Wardlow, the case that essentially said flight from
police in a high-crime neighborhood equals reasonable suspicion.73 Her
dissent further included Whren v. United States, the case allowing pretex-
tual vehicle stops,74 and Florida v. Bostick, which held that a “stop” is not
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if “a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise ter-
minate the encounter,” a reasonable person of course “presuppos[ing] an
innocent person.”75 And she cited to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, in
which the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment permits officers the
discretion to make a custodial arrest for a minor offense for which the
only possible sanction is a fine76—a decision which in turn opened the
door to the ability of officers to conduct searches incident to arrest.77
Again, none of the cases address the exclusionary rule per se, let alone
69. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 67, at 692–95.
70. Streiff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 2070.
72. Id. at 2069 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968)).
73. Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000)).
74. Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
75. Id. at 2070 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 438 (1991)).
76. Id. (citing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001)).
77. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
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the exception the majority relied on in Utah v. Strieff: attenuation.78
The secondary sources Justice Sotomayor cited were even more inter-
esting. She cited to Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, and to
W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk.79 She cited to James Bald-
win’s The Fire Next Time, and to Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World
and Me.80 She cited to Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres’s The Miner’s
Canary.81
I had read Justice Sotomayor’s dissent numerous times and had previ-
ously written about it; I even opened an article with it.82 And we had
already covered it in class, when we first discussed the exclusionary rule.
But this time, as I was preparing for class and thinking too about Crespo’s
observation that race is the room, I saw her dissent differently. It was as if
a proverbial light bulb went off. Or since I have been talking about archi-
tecture, let me say I experienced something similar to what the novelist
and essayist Toni Morrison describes in Playing in the Dark, about an
epiphany she had as she was reading American literature:
It is as if I had been looking at a fishbowl—the glide and flick of the
golden scales, the green tip, the bolt of white careening back from
the gills; the castles at the bottom, surrounded by pebbles and tiny,
intricate fronds of green; the barely disturbed water, the flecks of
waste and food, the tranquil bubbles traveling to the surface—and
suddenly I saw the bowl, the structure that transparently (and invisi-
bly) permits the ordered life it contains to exist in the larger world.83
Suddenly, I too was seeing the bowl, the structure that holds it all to-
gether. I already knew much of our criminal procedure jurisprudence was
inflected by race. I had myself previously argued that criminal procedure
cases should be thought of as “race cases,” even as “master texts that
contribute to an ideology of race and racial hierarchy.”84 But in preparing
for class, in “reading black,”85 I was suddenly thinking not only of crimi-
nal procedure cases as race cases. I was thinking of race being embedded
in the Fourth Amendment itself—as part of its structure, its architecture,
or at least the architecture we have built around it. Whereas in the past, I
had thought of our “rights” as a happy product of the Court’s concern
about race—think about the right to counsel,86 or the right to be free
78. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (majority opinion).
79. Id. (first citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 95–136 (2010); and
then citing W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903)).
80. Id. (first citing JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); and then citing TA-
NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015)).
81. Id. at 2071 (citing LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY
274–83 (2002)).
82. Capers, supra note 67, at 654.
83. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGI-
NATION 17 (1992).
84. Capers, supra note 67, at 693.
85. Bennett Capers, Reading Back, Reading Black, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 10 (2006).
86. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). Even though Gideon was white, the
concern about racial minorities lies just beneath the surface. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
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from coercion during interrogation,87 or the right to Miranda warnings,88
or the right to a jury trial,89 or for that matter the entire process of incor-
poration90—now I was seeing that this same architecture, like the archi-
tecture of courthouses, was also a means of justice and injustice. Race
was baked-in in more ways than I had first realized. It was there in the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test that determines whether the
Fourth Amendment provides protection at all,91 which of course privi-
leges those with means over those without, those who live in the suburbs
over those who live in the projects.92 It was there in the “reasonable per-
son would feel free to . . . terminate the encounter” test,93 which presup-
poses not only an innocent person94 but also a person who looks nothing
like me, a person who never has to worry that police violence is the sixth
leading cause of death for young black men.95 It was there in the architec-
ture around pretext stops which, given the hundreds of possible traffic
violations, boils down to permission to discriminate.96 It was there in the
Fourth Amendment’s fifty-four words and its application to only “unrea-
sonable searches and seizures,”97 which has always protected the value
judgments of the wider—and whiter—society. And it was there in the
Fourth Amendment’s language of “persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects,”98 and the fact that it was ratified at a time when people who
looked like me were themselves property, when the only papers people
who looked like me were entitled to—passes or free papers—were “sub-
ject to inspection and rejection at any time by slave patrols.”99 And as for
effects, “as property themselves, slaves had none to claim as their
own.”100 And it was there in the Court’s decision in Whren to reject the
very reconstruction—because we are back at architecture again—that the
81, 83 (1995); see also Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizen-
ship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011).
87. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–72 (1966).
89. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160–62 (1968).
90. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. 48, 62–67 (2000); Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 215, 222–24 (2003); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 820, 841–44 (1994).
91. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
92. See Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55
FLA. L. REV. 391, 411–12 (2003); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1266–67 (1999).
93. E.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
94. Id. at 438.
95. Police: Sixth-Leading Cause of Death for Young Black Men, supra note 65. See
generally Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts
About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243 (1991).
96. See Devon Carbado, Whren v. United States, in CRITICAL RACE JUDGMENTS: RE-
WRITTEN U.S. COURT OPINIONS ON RACE AND LAW (Capers et al. eds., forthcoming 2021).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
98. Id.
99. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1288
(2017).
100. Id.
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Reconstruction Amendments offered.101 For it was in Whren that the
Court made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not care about race
discrimination.102 It was in Whren that Justice Scalia, writing a unanimous
opinion, wrote, “[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, prob-
able-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”103 This spatial segregation of
constitutional rights, this adoption of the view that rights are “hermeti-
cally sealed units whose principles must not contaminate one another,”104
is also a kind of architecture.
I don’t mean to sound like an “Afropessimist,”105 especially since so
much of my recent work has been about Afrofuturism, about opti-
mism.106 But it does make one wonder: If the very architecture of the
Fourth Amendment is the problem—not just its interpretation but its
very design—what are we to do?
101. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
163, 193.
105. See FRANK B. WILDERSON III, AFROPESSIMISM (2020).
106. See Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year
2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 58–60 (2019).
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